Events and Exhibition in the Digital Age Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2000 words

Occasions and Exhibition in the Digital Age - Essay Example He says. In the United States, 14 to 15 percent of the promoting spending plan [of displaying companies] is committed to public expos. In Europe, the rate is 22 to 24 percent, A decent presentation makes an energetic retail condition, which in itself is an exceptional encounter for a wide range of organizations particularly those in the business-to-business field and administration divisions. This special thing about a show is that it makes a nonpartisan domain where purchasing and selling is a characteristic procedure. At displays, business simply occurs. A show guest is substantially more quiet than a client strolling into a store. Guests at a display or a public expo feel more in charge and subsequently less constrained or restless. This is a positive mind-set for them to have when you open up a business discourse with them. Right off the bat, your organization gets an opportunity to offer to several clients per day. On the off chance that the item is correct, the value offer is alluring, the bundling is luring then you could close inside and out requests with full installment/part up front installment. For the merchants, displays are a generous chance to meet new possibilities. Regardless of whether they close the deal without even a moment's pause relies upon the kind of products or administrations they offer. Be that as it may, shows give the absolute best chance to communicate with a great many imminent clients. This allows the vender to tell the possibility about the items offered, note their reactions, discover their opinion of the brand/item, its highlights, value, quality, remaining in the market, how much cash they are eager to spend on such an item, the opposition. For some product offerings this direct data is significant so as to improve their contribution as far as cost and different propert ies. A few presentations furnish you with a chance to sort out a private crowd with prospect clients allowing you the chance to establish a high effect connection with them since you can assault the entirety of their faculties and they can interface with you and see/contact/feel your items, through shows and preliminaries. Aside from the advertising edge, Exhibitions additionally give you a spot where you can do a few hands on research, meet and converse with your rivals, potential providers, find out about the new advancements in your product offering. In the event that you have another thought in the pipeline, displays can be an incredible spot to do some test advertising and discover how the market will react. Displays give the organizations a chance, 1. to sell the items straightforwardly to huge number of clients 2. to get a database of imminent clients to development 3. to bring issues to light of your business in a given geographic area 4. to dispatch or advance another item or administration 5. to meet existing clients and sell upkeep contracts and so forth. 6. to meet potential providers/accomplices/specialists/merchants A show is a genuine chance to show the character of a business. How might this benefit the guests/clients/overall population. Above all else, guests to shows and occasions are propelled to go to for

Islamic Culture (week 9) Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Islamic Culture (week 9) - Essay Example By following this behavior of varying the Muslim society can keep up the attributes of affection and fraternity between Muslims (Al-Hashmi, 2007). It is simple for the individuals to control themselves during the circumstance of understanding and act in appropriate way. Be that as it may, when individuals go into any sort of contradiction it gets hard for them to act in proper way. So as to legitimize their contention and perspective individuals enjoy exploitative method of contending which now and again additionally prompts battling. It is adequate to have an alternate conclusions with respect to a particular theme or matter. The adequate contradictions permit the individuals to get hold of various perspectives with solid proof and increment their insight. Be that as it may, there are some behavior of contrasting in the Muslim society which ought to be trailed by the Muslims. A portion of these manners are as follow (Al-Hashmi, 2007): Muslims should utilize proper and great words while contending and bantering with others and ought to keep away from the utilization of brutal words, as referenced in Holy Quran: ‘And Speak great to the people’. [Soorah al-Baqarah 2:83] The motivation behind conversation ought to be to get explanation and to recognize truth. The explanation for the conversation or contrasting assessment ought not be to fulfill self image or for feeling pleased. In conclusion, the gatherings and individuals associated with discussion or conversation should regard the assessment of others and if no understanding or common outcome is accomplished the discussion ought to be finished strong (Baianonie, 1998). Islam has given the idea of agreement, harmony, love, and fraternity between the Muslims and entire humanity. The idea of fraternity and agreement among the Muslims is a significant component in Islam and immense accentuation have been set on it from the very beginning. It is significant and fundamental to keep up the attributes of adoration and fraternity between Muslims since it

Life is Improv

Life is Improv The first and most important rule of improv is this: dont negate. To negate in improv is to break the flow of absurdity and belief that animates the sketch. When the Roadrunner points out to Wile E Coyote that hes standing only on thin air, hes negating. In improv, when you deny a fundamental premise of the sketch no, Zoe, youre not on the moon because you want to pull it in another direction. youre negating. This rule was also one of the toughest for me to master, when I did improv at summer camps and in high school. Though I like to think Im a kind person, Im also deeply sarcastic; its naturally easier for me to play the sardonic straight man and deliver a deflating riposte that points out how stupid the whole scene is. Im also someone who naturally likes to have a sense of control over things. Im not a control freak. But I like to do things my way, and I definitely, DEFINITELY like to plan things out. Looking at my (eight different color-coded) Google Calendar(s), I notice now that Ive booked every weekend from here through..well, freshman orientation for the class of 2015, in late August. You can see why these character traits made it difficult for me not to negate. Its easy, and comforting, to shut things down into the nice, clear plan youve made for yourself. Its scary, and risky, to accept another persons crazy idea, or to crumple up the plan and go with something else. But thats improv. Today was commencement for the Class of 2011 from MIT. This weekend, two of my cousins will be graduating high school as well; many of the Class of 2015 either have already or will soon go through the same pomp and circumstance. This makes me feel old. It also makes me feel nostalgic. Chris S, who graduated today, helped interview me for my current job. During CPW, late one night after all the other admissions officers had gone home, Snively asked me if I wanted a walking buddy; we spent hours going from dorm to dorm and eating midnight breakfasts together. So, on the occasion of commencement, heres one insight that I would share with past, present, and future graduates: Life is improv. ***** This doesnt mean that life is random, or farcical, or shouldnt be taken seriously. It also doesnt mean that you shouldnt think deliberately and carefully about decisions that you make, or strive to make the smartest decisions you can in any particular situation. What it means is this: The most important, and best, things that have happened to me, I didnt, and could not have, planned for. There was the professor with whom I took a class because it had an interesting title. I ended up TAing for him for three years. He chaired my thesis committee and I still occasionally advise his nonprofit organization. Hes one of the best academic mentors Ive ever had. The summer I began working at MIT, my then-girlfriend was a student intern at a free-speech organization. She had a big list of book bannings and challenges she had to categorize. I thought itd be cool to post them on a Google Map to visualize the trends. The end product got a lot of press, and I was asked to join the Board of Directors of a major anti-censorship advocacy group. None of that would have happened had I not felt like trying something out that seemed like it might be a cool idea. In fact, the best example of this principle from my entire life might actually be how I met that particular girl. See, some of her friends were visiting my alma mater when a riot broke out. A guy down the hall invited them back to ride out the storm in our dorm. A few weeks later, she came over to a party with her friends and these guys from my hall. Im a nondrinker, and a much better conversationalist than partier. But that night I decided to drop in and see what folks were doing. She and I started talking (actually we began viciously insulting each other remember what I said about sarcasm?); we became best friends and dated for several years. Even though that relationship eventually ended, were still close, and I learned more from that experience maybe more than anything else. And it wouldnt have happened if I hadnt decided to come out of my room and walk down to see what was up that one night. There are countless other examples I could provide. Incredibly important, wonderful things that have happened, people I have met, opportunities I have had, without me planning for them. They were, to reference Rumsfeld, unknown unknowns. I didnt know that I didnt know they would happen to me until they did, and were amazing. And not just big, life-changing events like these; small, wonderful moments too. Thinking Id go to bed on time one night and staying up late talking about something in the hallway. Ditching class one spring afternoon to go wandering around campus and finding my new favorite spot to study for future years. Applying randomly to a job at MIT and finding out its the best home Ive ever had. ***** There was a terrible movie that came out a few years ago called Yes Man. The premise is that Jim Carrey is a really withdrawn dude who suddenly becomes blessed/cursed with the inability to say no to any particular situation. He always has to say yes when anyone asks him to do whatever weird or crazy thing they ask him to do. I wouldnt recommend taking dont negate quite so literally (nor would I recommend seeing the movie). But the core principle is correct. When you get to college or, for the class of 2011, when you get to the rest of your life there will be so many opportunities for you to have. There will be so many times when people want to go do something. Maybe stay up late and just BS in the hallway while eating pizza. Maybe go over to a machine shop to make a crazy motorized shopping cart. Maybe go hang out with some cute girls visiting from another campus. You are not going to have enough time in your life to say yes to every opportunity you have. But it is imperative that you say yes as often as possible. The worst thing you can do in college and in life is to close off opportunities for spontaneous serendipity. Its not easy. Theres comfort in planning. Comfort in booking yourself solid, losing yourself in your schedule; I think this is what a lot of workaholics (including myself) do to cope with the discomfort of the realization that so much of what happens in life is outside of our control. You schedule every minute of your day so that you never have the time to look down and realize youre standing on thin air. This leads me to my other, ancillary point about life being improv: You cant plan your life. You can only prepare for it. Ive now fully realized and internalized the fact that I am not in sole control of my life. But I have also come to understand that that doesnt matter as long as Im prepared for it. The same is true for you. Part of that preparation is education, like the one I received and you all will (or have) receive at MIT. Part of that preparation is mindset. You have to be prepared not to negate, to leave yourself open to opportunities, and to seek out serendipity in as much as you can. You cant always (if ever) control the things that will happen to you. But you can control how prepared you are to take advantage of them when the opportunity arises, and to condition yourself to take the leap to pursue them. Whether youre a member of the class of 2011 or 2015, your life is about to change drastically. Let it happen. Let yourself be open and available to the moments of magic that happen in our lives. That are our lives. Never put on the blinders. Never try to wrest too much control of your life from the narrative of the world. The sketch is bigger and more powerful than you; all youre doing is boxing yourself in to your own bit part, somewhere off stage left. All you have to do is keep the energy going. Keep the scene flowing. Dont negate. Everyone else is in the same thin air you are. No one has it figured out and thats awesome. So just keep whistling and walking along. You are going to do great things in the world. You dont know what those things are yet and that is ok, because if you thought you did, youd only be shutting doors you didnt even know were open yet. And the amazing truth is: if you leave those doors of opportunity open, only good things will find their way in. Best of luck. I am proud of each and every one of you.

The Relationship And Impact Of Different Variables Finance Essay - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 24 Words: 7131 Downloads: 1 Date added: 2017/06/26 Category Finance Essay Type Research paper Did you like this example? Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest that firms which have unique or specialized products have comparatively low debt ratios and the smaller firms use greatly more short-term debt than larger firms. Titman and Wessels (1988) also found no evidence to support theoretical work that forecast that debt ratios are related to a firms expected growth, non-debt tax shields, volatility, or the collateral value of its assets; however, Titman and Wessels (1988) found some support for the intention that profitable firms have comparatively less debt relative to the market value of their equity. Titman and Wessels (1988) reported that Equity-controlled firms have a propensity to spend sub optimally to seize wealth from the firms bondholders. The cost which is linked with this agency relationship is likely to be higher for firms in growing industries, which have more elasticity in their choice of future investments. By reading this statement the expected future growth should hence be negatively related to long-term debt levels. Titman and Wessels (1988) found that it should also be noted that growth opportunities are capital assets that add value to a firm but they are not to be collateralized and they do not generate taxable income. For this reason, the arguments put forth in the previous subsections also suggest a negative relation between debt and growth opportunities. Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest that when firms prefer raising capital then they first raise from retained earnings, second from debt, and third from issuing new equity. In each case, the past profitability of a firm, and thus the amount of earnings available to be retained, should be an important determinant of its current capital structure. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) suggest that firms often make financing decisions that compensate these earnings changes in their capital structures. Particularly, when firms either raise or retire major amounts of new capital then their choic es move them toward the target capital structures. This qualitative pattern keeps on in spite of the maturity or the convertibility of the debt which has already been issued. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) argued that the propensity of firms to make financial choices that shift them toward a target debt ratio appear to be more important when they are going to choose between equity repurchases and debt retirements than when they are going to choose between equity and debt issuances. This evidence suggests that capital structure considerations play a much more important role when firms repurchase rather than raise capital. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) suggest that stock prices also play a vital role in shaping a firms financing choice. Firms issue equity and retire debt practice large stock price increases than the firms that experience stock price declines. This observation is constant with stock price increases are generally associated with improved growth opportunitie s, which would lower a firms optimal debt ratio. Ferri and Jones (1979) argued about the connection between size of the firm and leverage, which has gained some consideration in recent years. The motivation for the belief is that firms which are more diversified, enjoy the easier access to capital markets, also they receive higher credit ratings for their debt issues, and pay lower interest rates on borrowed funds. Therefore it is reasonable that the use of debt is positively related to the capital size of the firm. Harris and Raviv (1990) presented a theory of capital structure based on the consequence of debt on investors information regarding the firm and on their capability to supervise management. Harris and Raviv (1990) contend that, in general, managers do not always perform in the best interests of their investors and as a result need to be disciplined. Debt provides a disciplining device because default permits creditors the option to compel the firm into liquidation. Moreover, debt also causes information that can be used by investors to assess major operating decisions including liquidation. The informational penalty of debt is twice over. First, the simple ability of the firm to make its contractual expenses to debt holders provides information. Second, in default management must pacify creditors to keep away from liquidation, either through informal discussions or through formal bankruptcy procedures. This process, although costly, disseminates substantial information to investors. Based on the information produced, default can result in major changes in working policy (including liquidation) and restructuring of the financial structure. Harris and Raviv (1990) recommended that, if investors are unsure about the quality of management and the efficiency of business strategy, they can use debt to produce information about these aspects and to acquire a say in setting operating policy. Moreover, the amount and helpfulness of the information gen erated depends on the agenda of debt payments, both timing and quantity. As a result, stockholders will design debt expenditure, i.e., capital structure over time, at least in part to develop the ability of debt to generate constructive information. Harris and Raviv (1990) offered a theory of capital structure supported on the idea that debt permits investors to discipline management and offered information useful for this reason. Investors use information about the firms prospects to come to a decision whether to liquidate the firm or carry on current operations. Harris and Raviv (1990) postulate that managers are unwilling to liquidate the firm under any conditions and are reluctant to provide thorough information to investors that could effect in such an outcome. As a result, investors use debt to generate information and watch management. They gather information from the firms capability to build payments and from a costly searching in the event of default. Debt holders make use of their legal rights to compel management to make available information and to implement the resulting competent liquidation decision. The optimal amount of debt is dogged by trading off the worth of information and opportunities for disciplining management adjacent to the chance of incurring investigation costs. Harris and Raviv (1990) predicted that firms with higher liquidation value, which are those with tangible assets, will be having more debt, will be having higher yield debt, will be more possible to default, but they will have higher market worth than similar firms with lower liquidation value. The perception for the higher debt level is that boost in liquidation value make it more possible that liquidation is the best strategy. So, information is more helpful. This also results in higher default chance. It is not clear a priori that higher debt levels consequence in higher promised yields, because greater liquidation value means that debt holders will charge better in de fault. The reduction in the debt coverage ratio is a direct result of the increase in debt level since expected income does not transform with liquidation value or defaulting costs. Harris and Raviv (1990) argued that increase in bankruptcy value and/or decreases in default costs cause increase in both debt level and firm value. Therefore, increases in debt level should usually be accompanied by increases in firm value. This is dependable with a number of observed studies document the price effects of exchanges of debt and equity. Rajan and Zingales (1995) investigated the determinants of capital structure choice by examining the financing choices of public firms in the major industrialized countries. At an collective level, firm leverage is quite similar across the G-7 countries. Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that factors recognized by earlier studies as correlated in the cross section with firm leverage in the United States, are likewise correlated in other countries also. On the other hand, a deeper assessment of the U.S. and foreign evidence recommended that the theoretical underpinnings of the pragmatic correlations are still largely unsettled. Rajan and Zingales (1995) then analyzed the major institutional distinctions across countries and their possible impact on financing decisions. Even if the G-7 countries are fairly identical in their level of economic development their institutions as represented by the tax and bankruptcy code, by the market for corporate control, and also by the past role played by banks and securities markets are quite different. Apart from setting up a structure within which to know between country dissimilarity, the review of institutions is vital because they may affect the within country cross sectional association between leverage and the factors such as firm profitability and firm size. This may help to identify the factual economic forces underlying the factors. Finally, Rajan and Zingales (1995) computed the within c ountry fractional correlations between leverage and the factors recognized as important in the United States. It is outstanding that these factors are, also correlated with leverage in other countries. While the consistency in correlations may point out that there are certainly underlying forces that persuade capital structure choice, there may also be cause to doubt the understanding of what these forces are or how the institutional dissimilarity identified above moderate their influence. For example, leverage boosts with size in all countries except Germany. A potential explanation is that larger firms are better diversified and have a lower likelihood of being in financial pain. Lower expected bankruptcy costs allow them to take on additional leverage. Bancel and Mittoo (2004) reviewed managers in 16 European countries on the determinants of capital structure. Financial elasticity and earnings per share strength are primary apprehension of managers in concerning to issue debt and common stock, respectively. Managers also give importance to hedging concerns and use windows of opportunityà ¢ÃƒÆ' ¢Ãƒ ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¡Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ¬Ãƒâ€šÃ‚  when increase capital. Bancel and Mittoo (2004) found that even though a countrys legal situation is a significant determinant of debt policy, it plays a smallest role in common stock policy to find that firms financing policies are inclined by both their institutional environment and their international procedures. Firms decide their optimal capital structure by trading off costs and benefits of financing. Bancel and Mittoo (2004) observed the facts on whether financing rules of firms are determined first and foremost by the legal system of its home country or whether other country institutions also participate a major role is unclear. A main trouble in the cross-country research is that differences in accounting and disclosure practices compose it hard to compare and understand financial data across countries. Additionally, d ifferent mechanism of leverage, such as debt or equity, is likely to be influenced in a different way by various institutions. For instance, debt financing is likely to be more insightful to the bankruptcy law, but equity financing might be inclined more by the stock market regulation in a specified country. Furthermore, it is nearly impossible to gather data on the development of the financial system in a country over time. To the degree a countrys institutions have an effect on its financing structure; their force should be reflected in managerial policies and practices in that specified country. Leary and Roberts (2005) argued that firms do struggle to maintain an optimal capital structure that stable the costs and benefits related with varying degrees of financial leverage. When firms are anxious from this optimum, this outlook argues that companies react by rebalancing their leverage back to their optimal level. However, latest empirical data has led researchers to question whether firms actually take on in such an energetic rebalancing of their capital structures. Leary and Roberts (2005) noted that the debt ratios of the firms adjust slowly toward their targets. So as to, firms appear to take a extensive time to return their leverage to its long run mean or, slackly speaking, optimal level. In addition, past efforts to time equity issuances with far above the ground market valuations have a persistent force on corporate capital structures. This fact directs them to end that capital structures are the collective result of historical market timing efforts, relatively than the result of a dynamic optimizing approach. Finally, Leary and Roberts (2005) found that equity price shocks have a long-term effect on corporate capital structures as well. It concludes that stock returns are the major determinant of capital structure changes and that corporate intentions for net issuing activity are largely confidentiality. These findings contribute to the common s ubject matter that shocks to corporate capital structures have a constant effect on leverage. Mainly empirical tests, however, totally assume that this rebalancing is cost less: in the lack of adjustment costs, firms can always rebalance their capital structures toward an optimal level of leverage. On the other hand, in the occurrence of such costs, it may be suboptimal to react immediately to capital structure shocks. If the costs of such adjustments be more important than the benefits, firms will wait to recapitalize, resulting in comprehensive expedition away from their targets. These periods of financing stillness, persuaded by the existence of adjustment costs, have quite a lot of implications for the dynamic performance of capital structures and empirical studies in search of understanding corporate financial policy. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) argued that under the tradeoff theory of capital structure, firms decide their favored leverage ratio by calculating the tax adv antages, costs of financial distress, mispricing, and motivation effects of debt versus equity. The empirical literature has hunt for proof that firms choose their capital structure, as this theory forecasts, by estimating firm leverage as a purpose of firm characteristics. Firms for whom the tax shields of debt are larger, the costs of financial distress lower, and the mispricing of debt in relation to equity more favorable are likely to be greatly levered. When these firms find out that the net advantage of debt is positive, they will shift toward their preferred capital structure by issuing extra debt and/or reducing their equity. The understood assumption has been that a firms leverage is totally a function of a firms demand for debt. In other words, the supply of capital is considerably flexible at the correct price, and the cost of capital depends only on the threat of the firms projects. Debt ratios should depend on firm distinctiveness as well. Accordingly, a difference in l everage does not essentially mean that firms are constrained by the debt markets. The distinction could be the product of firms with different characteristics optimally making diverse decisions about leverage. Nonetheless, this does not show to be the case. It shows that even after controlling for the firm distinctiveness, which theory and previous empirical work argue decide a firms choice of leverage, firms with right of entry to the public debt market have higher leverage that is both economically and statistically important. Finally, Faulkender and Petersen (2006) considered the possibility that right of entry to the public debt markets is endogenous and that firms with right of entry to the public debt markets have considerably higher leverage ratios. Schwartz (1959) argued that hardly there is exist of a complete model of the optimal capital structure of the firm. Many of the ideas needed to build such a model are available in the literature, but in most cases the authors h ave been satisfied to set up and use only such incomplete builds as would serve their larger purposes. Schwartz (1959) further argued that this article is an attempt to increase a self controlled theory of the financial structure of the individual firm. It has been said that the complexity of the capital or financial structure is a firm, not a plant, decision. The underlying idea is that, whereas the optimal output is exclusively determined if demand and costs are known, financing is, in large part, a matter of the individual taste for risk and is therefore an ownership or firm decision, for which a unique solution may not be possible. I should like to present the contrary view, that there is perhaps a single optimum capital arrangement for any given firm or that, at the least, the range of balanced capital structures is hardly bounded. In the real world, ambiguity and lack of knowledge as to the related variables may make this optimal solution a difficult accomplishment. Under posi tive simplifying guess, still, a theoretical model of the relevant variables and functions can be constructed which does effect in a single finest financial structure. Schwartz (1959) also argued that the efficacy of such a model is in the simplifying insights it may provide us into the complexities of actuality. For many writers of corporation finance the term the capital structure of the firm appears to comprise only those foundations of funds which are represented by securities. The fine definition of the financial structure limited essentially to stocks and bonds ignores the large measure of substitutability accessible between the various forms of external debt. For reasons of this article the terms capital structure and financial structure are to be measured identical. The phrase the capital structure of the firm means the total of all liabilities and rights claims the sum of what is frequently the credit side of the balance sheet. The acceptance of this broader meaning of fina ncial structure, i.e., the liability and net value side of the balance sheet, allows us to think on what is accepted as the best single measure of gross risk the ratio of total debt to net worth. Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) used a new solid level database to inspect the financial structures of firms in a sample of 10 developing countries. Therefore, this study assists in determining whether the stylized information learned from lessons of developed countries apply merely to these markets, or whether they have additional general applicability. The focus is on answering the three questions: first question is that do corporate financial leverage decisions vary significantly between developing and developed countries? Second question is that the aspects that influence cross sectional variability in individual countries capital structures are alike between developed and developing countries? And the third question is the predictions of conventional capital fo rmation models enhanced by knowing the nationality of the company? This very last question is mainly important, because special institutional factors, such as tax rates and business risk, can consequence in diverse financing patterns, which then show up in firm statistics as well as the cumulative flow of funds data. Consequently, it is interesting to think the added value of company investigation versus a simple country classification. Taken as a whole importance and signs on the coefficients for size, tangibility, and profitability are similar to Rajan and Zingales (1995) studies of their sample of G-7 countries, except for that the proof in favor of a negative relation between profitability and leverage is greatly stronger. Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) found that the variables that are related for the explanation of capital structures in the United States and European countries are too relevant in developing countries, in spite of the deep differences in institutional factors across these developing countries. These factors help forecast the financial structure of a company better than knowing only its nationality. A steady result in both the country and joint data results is that the more profitable the firm, the lower the debt ratio, in spite of how the debt ratio is defined. This result proposes that external financing is costly and so avoided by firms. On the other hand, a more straight explanation is that money-making firms have less demand for external financing. This explanation would maintain the argument that there are agency costs of managerial discretion. in addition, this outcome does not sit well with the static trade-off model, under which we would be expecting that highly profitable firms would make use of more debt to lower their tax bill. It could be argued that such firms furthermore have large growth options and far above the ground market-to-book ratios, so that the agency costs of debt would entail low debt rati os. Conversely, this possibility relies on an quarrel that high market-to-book ratios are related with high levels of current profitability, which is not necessarily factual. Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) argued that the significance of profitability also clarifies why the average-tax-rate variable be inclined to have a pessimistic effect on debt ratios, because rather than being a proxy for debt tax-shield values, it looks to be an substitute measure of profitability. In addition, there is support for the function of asset tangibility in financing decisions. Evidently, asset tangibility has an effect on total and long term debt decisions in a different way. This would be expected from the long-standing argument regarding matching and from the importance in bank financing on collateral for shorter-term loans. In general, the more tangible the asset mix is the higher the long-term debt ratio is, but then there is the smaller the total-debt ratio. This shows th at as the tangibility of a firms assets boosts, like one percent, even though the long-term debt ratio increases, the total-debt ratio drops; so as to is, the substitution of long-term for short-term debt is less than one. In the individual country data, Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) also found support for the impact of intangibles and growth options. While in the collective data it looks that companies decrease their debt financing, as calculated by the book-debt ratios, when the market-to-book ratio boosts, these results seem to be proxies for general country factors. These results do not continue when they include country dummies. In conclusion, the estimated observed average tax rate does not seem to have an effect on financing decisions, except for corporate profitability. Therefore, the respond to the first two questions posed in the introduction is that debt ratios in developing countries look to be affected in the same mode and by the same types of va riables that are important in developed countries. Though, there are systematic dissimilarities in the way these ratios are affected by country factors, like GDP growth rates, the development of capital markets and inflation rates. Ramezani, Soenen, Jung (2002) considered the association between growth and company performance in two steps. First, they look at the absolute distribution of several performance metrics crosswise the quartiles of two growth measures. After that, using a common set of data as conditioning variables, they estimated a multivariate regression model for every growth calculation. The investment industry demands that managers make best use of sales and earnings growth over time. This recommendation is support on the opinion that growth is identical with shareholder value creation. Their experiential results showed that maximizing growth does not exploit corporate profitability or shareholder value. On the other hand, companies with sensible growth in sales o r earnings demonstrate the maximum rates of return and value creation for their owners. These outcomes support about the dangers of in compliance to market pressures for growth. Castanias (1983) found experiential results reported here reliable with an option of the tax shelter bankruptcy cost model in that firms in appearance of business that is likely to have high collapse rates also tend to have a smaller amount of debt in their capital structures. Most significantly, on the other hand, the empirical results are not dependable with the capital structure irrelevance model of. The results are reliable with the default costs which are large enough to bring the typical firm to grasp an optimal mix of debt and equity. The conclusion that default costs are big enough to have a considerable impact on the leverage strategy of the firm seems to be inconsistent with a lot of experiential research. The cross-sectional environment of the tests performed here and the examination of the ass ociation between past failure rates and leverage may elucidate, in part, why this study was able to find a methodical relationship where others have not. It should also be in consideration that the data set used in this research is much more heavily subjective toward smaller firms than those used in any of the studies discussed. Additionally, research may well agree with that, for smaller firms, default costs and business risk are significant factors affecting optimal leverage ranks. Edwin, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) argued that a capital structure model is to ignore the firms finest reorganization choices in response to fluctuations in asset values over time. In particular, in the deficiency of transactions costs, firms could take large amounts of debt and, by the suitable repurchase approach, detain large tax shields at the same time as keeping the debt essentially riskless. The existence of transactions costs make difficult the problem but make its study still more interestin g. Big adjustment costs could possibly clarify the experimental wide difference in actual debt ratios, as firms would be forced into long digression away from their initial debt ratios. If adjustment expenses are big, so that some firms obtain extended excursions away from their goal, then they ought to give fewer attentions to cleansing static tradeoff stories and comparatively more too thoughtful what the adjustment costs are, why they are so significant and how normal managers would respond to them. Edwin, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) found the results which demonstrate the hazard of viewing experiential debt ratios as optimal; to stay away from these problems they employed a different evaluation type of capital structure significance, that is the range over which the firm allows its debt ratio to be different. The model provided different predictions relating firm explicit properties to the variety of optimal leverage ratios: smaller, riskier, lower-tax, lower-bankruptcy cost fir ms will show wider move to and fro in their debt ratios over time. As noted above, a number of of the results depend upon the implicit form of connections costs and upon the ability to recommits to a first top recapitalization policy. Evidently, Edwin, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) argued that extra work is required to discover the impact of alternative functional forms for recapitalization expenditure and to broaden other static theories to a dynamic setting. On the other hand, while their predictions came from one specific way of characterizing the benefits and expenses of debt financing, they may establish more general than the primary model. They viewed trouble-free tests as only a first effort to study empirically firms dynamic capital structure performance. MacKay and Phillips (2005) examined how intra industry difference in financial structure relates to industry factors and whether actual and financial decisions are equally determined within industries. They based their exa mination on models of aggressive industry equilibrium. In general, their research began to link the space between investigational studies of incomplete equilibrium models, which basically use firm difference to test representative firm performance, and industry symmetry models, which indigenize firm difference and link firm-level decisions to broader equilibrium forces. The rest of the research was organized as reviewing the financial arrangement literature and discussed the experimental propositions of the industry equilibrium models. Further the research described data sources, sample selection, and the variables they used to examine these implications. MacKay and Phillips (2005) examined the significance of industry to firms actual and financial decisions. They found that industry fixed effects give details far less of the deviation in financial structure than do firm fixed possessions. On the other hand, they found that industry related factors further than industry fixed effect s can clarify part of this broad intra industry distinction in financial structure in aggressive industries. MacKay and Phillips (2005) findings supported the idea that industry factors have an effect on not only individual firm decisions but also the joint distribution of authentic side and financial distinctiveness within industries. They found that accounting for a firms situation within its industry is vital both economically and statistically. Their finding that own firm financial structure depends on changes made by industry peers demonstrates the importance of industry interdependence still in competitive industries. In competitive industries, they found that firms with capital labor ratios close to the industry median use less financial leverage than firms that go away from the industry median capital-labor ratio. They also found that real and financial variables are further isolated in competitive industries, reliable with the intra industry variety forecasted in models of competitive industry balance. MacKay and Phillips (2005) found that financial structure, technology, and risk are at the same time determined. Their research has sensible implications for future research. First, they showed that simple measures of a firms situation within its industry help them recognize how firms choose financial structure. These procedures are simple to build and reasonably significant. Second, their research supported the intention that benchmarks should be shaped on numerous inside industry measures by the side of both real and financial variables rather than just relying on only measures such as industry dummies, or industry means or medians. On the whole, their evidence showed that industry factors help elucidate firm financial structure, the diversity of firms that inhabit industries, and the simultaneity of real and financial decisions. MacKay and Phillips (2005) concluded that departures from the mean industry financial structure are methodically related to technology and risk options comparative to the industry. When firms depart from industry standards for financial structure, they also systematically depart along technology and risk proportions. Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) examined that at what extent managers use the guess and inputs of capital formation models generated by academicians in making financing choice. This showed that capital structure decisions do not have a consequence on firmà ¢ÃƒÆ' ¢Ãƒ ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¡Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ¬ÃƒÆ' ¢Ãƒ ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ¢s worth when capital markets are perfect, corporate and individual taxes do not exist, and the firms financing and investment decisions are self-determining. Though, when one or more of the assumptions are comfortable, many authors express how firmà ¢ÃƒÆ' ¢Ãƒ ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¡Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ¬ÃƒÆ' ¢Ãƒ ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ¢s worth may differ with changes in the debt equity jumble. Most often, the optimal capital structure take full advantage of firm value by concurrently minimizing exterior claims to the cash flow torrent flowing from the firms assets. Such claims comprise taxes paid to the government by the firm and its security holders; bankruptcy costs remunerated to accountants, lawyers, and the firms vendors; and agency costs gained to bring into line executive interests with the interests of capital suppliers. In anticipation of the capital structure debate was mostly a theoretical one, with the relevance or irrelevance of financing decisions rotating on the willingness to recognize the continuation of significant market imperfections. On the other hand, Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) summarized nicely that now changes in a firms capital structure can influence firm value. To reduce total agency costs, managers issue together debt and equity and have the same opinion to restraining agreements written into bond indentures. Therefore, firms exclusive optimal capital structures entail a balance of debt and equity, even if neither corporate nor personal taxes are unspecified to exist. They assumed that the firm is rate too low as managers have, but cannot disclose, information that the market lacks regarding new and existing investment opportunities. Managers keep away from issuing undervalued securities by financing first with internal equity and then with external claims that are slightest to be mispriced. Internal equity is the mainly preferred source, external equity is the slightest, and then straight and convertible debts are in the middle. They developed a model in which inside funding strictly dominates external sources. Though, it makes no dissimilarity among the types of external funds raised for the reason that all such sources indicate to the market that inner sources have fallen short of projections. Therefore, it represents the capital structure category in which neither an optimal mixture nor an optimal ladder of external sources is disguised. The predictions of the previous models follow in a straight line from the assump tions used to build up them. The models assumed that corporate taxes do not exist; static tradeoff models assumed that the investors and the managers both have equal information about actual growth opportunities. Although such assumptions make the models well brought-up, they over simplify the conditions below which managers make. Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) argued that corporate managers in this are more expected to follow a financing chain of command than to sustain a target debt equity ratio. Additionally, models based on corporate personal taxes and bankruptcy and additional leverage related costs are not as helpful in determining the financing mix as are models that propose that new financing disclose aspects of the firms unimportant asset performance. On the other hand, the significance managers attach to specific capital structure theories is not connected to managerial perceptions of market competence. Therefore, most managers do not openly signal firm value from side to si de capital structure adjustments. In general, financial development values are more important in leading the financing decisions of the firm than are exact capital structure theories. Bagwell and Zechner (1993) analyzed the role of capital structure in the existence of intra firm pressure activities. They examined the particular pressure actions close to a firms decision whether to divest a division. Divestiture produces in particular sensitive motivation to influence top management, in view of the fact that if the division is sold, then workers and managers of the division may go down all or part of the quasi rents that they make as being part of the firm. The research exhibits that, by distressing the firms future divestiture decisions, the capital structure can be selected optimally to decrease or amplify the divisional managers incentives to influence top managements choices. This may lead to a more competent result. Conversely, the promise inherent in debt also forces top ma nagement to occasionally sell divisions that would be best to keep or to keep divisions that would be best to divest. For this reason, there emerges an optimal capital structure that trades off the expenses of influence behavior in opposition to the costs of making poor divestiture decisions. Bagwell and Zechner (1993) modeled two different examples of persuade activities. In the first requirement, the top manager receives wonderful information about the continuing value of the division before the divestiture decision is completed. If the division is revealed not to be fruitful within the existing firm, then it is beneficial to sell it if a good divestiture chance arises. The divisional managers can effort to influence the divestiture choice by affecting the likelihood that a good divestiture opportunity arises. And particularly, this is accomplished by lowering the coming probability of a lofty synergy bidder. This requirement captures the intuition that, divisional managers may bu ild them-selves unique through investing in assets with profits reliant on the managers own information and attributes. In the next condition of influence behavior, the top manager receives only deficient information relating to the continuing value of the division, by observing a money flow that the division generates. If a higher divisional money flow is pragmatic, it is more possible that the division is more profitable inside the firm than when acquired by another firm. The divisional managers might for that reason effort to influence the top managers divestiture decision by uneven future money flows to the present. Such narrow-minded behavior may be optimal from the divisional managers point of view because it reduces the possibility of a divestiture. Bagwell and Zechner (1993) argued that this is incompetent for the firm since, to improve money flows in the short run, the division must abandon good long-term investments. While this ineffectiveness itself is clearly harmful to the firm, influence behaviors may actually be either beneficial or injurious to the firm, since they also have a consequence on the excellence of the information that is conveyed to the top management by experimental divisional money flows. As a result, in some belongings, influence behavior may in fact be beneficial to the firm because they get better the managements aptitude to differentiate between unbeneficial and beneficial divisions. Bagwell and Zechner (1993) found that equity or long-term debt financing is optimal for rising firms for which the possibility of divestiture is basically zero. For these firms influence behaviors are not important. Firms with a optimistic possibility that a divestiture might turn out to be optimal may issue equity, unsafe short or collateralized long-term debt. Unsafe short-term debt may be issued for two differing reasons. One reason can be that firms for which the inefficiencies due to divisional influence activities are comparatively low but t he information generated by influence behaviors is particularly precious may issue reasonable amounts of risky short-term debt to persuade influence activities. On the other hand, firms for which there is a major possibility of a divestiture even without debt might wish to issue a high quantity of risky short-term debt to decrease the top managers judgment over future divestiture decisions. This may be beneficial for the firm if there is a high preceding possibility that divestiture of the division will be optimal, if the expenses to the firm of influence behaviors are high, and if the expenses to the firm of compulsory divestiture during financial suffering are low. Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005) suggested that the trade-off model execute sensibly fine in predicting capital structures for firms with characteristic levels of debt. Undoubtedly, it seems unsuitable as bankruptcy expenses are much bigger than this implies. The model indicated that, in adding up to the t ax shields, major determinants of capital structure comprise the basic risk of the firms assets, the prime of life of the debt, the capability of debt holders to strengthen default for a given level of firm worth, and the incremental insolvency costs restricted on failure to pay. It is essential to be familiar with the trade-off model this research described predicts capital structures that are comparatively alike to those experimental for a typical firm; it does not think about all determinants of the capital structure options. Research model did not explain cross-sectional disparity in capital structures attributable to factors such as strategic thoughts or investment chances, nor did it report for other factors, such as dissimilarities in managerial risk repugnance, that would be essential to clarify such differences. As a result, whereas this study contributes to our largely understanding of capital structure option, it surely does not determine all issues. In Ju, Parrino, Potes hman, and Weisbach (2005) model, each possible capital structure implies unlike values for the debt tax shields and insolvency costs, and in the end different value distributions for the firms securities. Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005) defined an optimal capital structure as the debt value that exploit the entire levered value of the firm and compute optimal capital structures for a range of firm characteristics. This research considered a model of optimal capital structure in which the main forces disturbing a firms financing decisions are corporate taxes and insolvency costs, this model integrate effects that have been argued at great extent in the business finance literature. The model included a number of features intended to detain key fundamentals of the capital structure decision in a pragmatic way, including conditional claim assessment of tax shields, a liquidation boundary on firm value under which firms failure to pay, and a target capital structure at which the firm refinances its debt at middle age. Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005) calculated closed-form solutions for significant quantities in this model, calibrated it using current market data, and resolve for the optimal capital structure. Model is at variance from models in the past literature in that it used a lively approach with a boundary on firm worth, underneath which firms default and optimally systematize. In difference to most of the literature at least since this research found that the trade-off model does not forecast that firms are under levered. For a imaginary firm constructed to be distinctive of large, in public traded companies, the model forecasted a leverage ratio less than the real sample median. Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005) suggested that a relatively uncomplicated model in which the only factors that have an effect on capital structure are corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs can guide to predicted leverage ratios reliable with the e xperimental data. The magnitudes of the predicted optimal leverage ratios reported were powerfully prejudiced by the dynamic nature of the model. Having the elasticity to rebalance the capital structure as the worth of a firms assets changes allows the firm to profit from bigger tax shields. And in a dynamic model, the firm tactically lowers its preliminary leverage ratio to avoid insolvency so that it can optimally handle the assets when the accessible debt matures. In distinction, in static models, the firm issues debt more assertively because, as the value of its assets is likely to increase in the future, it is not able to rebalance its capital structure to replicate this raise. Johnson (1998) argued that in the capital structure literature, many academic models derived an inner optimal leverage based on expenses stemming from asymmetric information problems. In the banking literature, a growing number of academic models focus on the role bank viewing and monitoring play in d ropping the harms linked with external financing in asymmetric information. Results shown that leverage is statistically drastically higher for firms that use bank debt; the results are also economically considerable. The consequences are healthy when there is a control for factors found in other studies to be determinants of leverage, when there is a control for maturity and security differences in firms debt arrangements, and when there is a control for credit hazard. The relation between leverage and bank debt make use of come into view to engage bank debt attenuating the pessimistic effects on leverage of potential asset replacement problems. This is only an incomplete clarification; on the other hand, suggestive of future theoretical and empirical study should discover this question further. Results of Johnson (1998) implied that bank selection and monitoring can lighten tensions stuck between borrowers and lenders. The agency cost literature suggested other means for alleviati ng these tensions, which comprise varying debt levels and debt distinctiveness like maturity, guarantee, exchange features, and covenants. Agency theory proposes that firms choose the slightest expensive mechanisms to decide their agency troubles. An attractive future research issue is what determines a firms choices from among the substitute mechanisms. The relation connecting leverage and bank debt employ entails that choosing debt possession is an important constituent of the capital structure decision. In fact, leverage and debt resource option decisions are potentially made together. Document experimental associations between firms debt source choices and several firm distinctiveness recognized in earlier studies as determinants of leverage. The existing theoretical literature does not offer a way to replica the leverage option and the debt source option at the same time. Johnson (1998) further argued that this matter would also be an appealing research question. The consequenc es grasp over the subsample of firms with no public debt outstanding, which entails that the dissimilarity between bank debt and private non-bank debt is carrying great weight. Collective with evidence of other differences on the cross firms that make use of bank debt and those that make use of private non-bank debt, Johnson (1998) results suggested that theoretical models that focus only on the private or public debt option are too preventive. Upcoming research should look at whether the distinction between bank debt and private non-bank debt curtail from degree of difference regulations, from banks deposit and lending associations with borrowers, or from other factors. Johnson (1998) results also showed that firms by means of access to public debt markets too have higher leverage if they have a loan of some of their debt from banks. Johnson (1998) further argued that future research should scrutinize whether these firms have higher leverage since they are monitored, for the reason that bank debt is more simply renegotiated, or for the reason that of other factors. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "The Relationship And Impact Of Different Variables Finance Essay" essay for you Create order

The Menstrual Cycle Essay - 769 Words

The menstrual cycle occurs in the uterus and the ovary as a part of making sexual reproduction possible. The menstrual cycle is a monthly occurrence and happens so the ovary can produce eggs and the uterus can get ready for an egg becoming fertilized. (Wikipedia) The menstrual cycle is a complex cycle and is controlled by hormones produced by many different glands. The hypothalamus causes the pituitary gland to produces chemicals which then cause the ovaries to produce the sex hormones oestrogen and progesterone. Each gland and structure is affected by the activity of another which is a biofeedback . The menstrual cycle has been assumed to last around 28 days and happens in four stages, the menstrual phase (day 1-5), follicular phase (day†¦show more content†¦Negative feedback is caused from the low levels of oestrogen, sending a message to the pituitary gland to increase the levels of FSH and LH. The second phase, follicular phase also starts on the first day of menstruation but unlike the menstruation phase it last until day 13. During this phase the hormone oestrogen is produced, which cause the uterus lining to grow, getting ready to receive a fertilized egg if you happen to get pregnant. (Menstrupedia) The hormone follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) also stimulates the growth of the ovarian follicles. Each of the follicles contains an immature egg. Towards the end of the follicle stage only one follicle will remain active. While the egg cell matures, this stimulates the uterus starts to thicken and prepare for pregnancy. The developing follicle causes a rise in the oestrogen levels which is detected by the hypothalamus which releases the hormone gonadotrophn releasing hormone (GnRH) which prompts the pituitary gland to produce higher levels of luteinising hormone (LH) and FSH. The third phase, ovulation phase happens on day 14, is the release of a mature egg, which usually happens around two weeks before the start of menstruation. (Menstrupedia) During this phase meiosis I occurs so a secondary oocyte is formed. Meiosis I is the dividing of a cell to produce two haploid cells. The high levels of LH, within two days, triggers ovulation. The uterus lining prepares for implantation as it continues to grow andShow MoreRelatedMenstrual Cycle7395 Words   |  30 PagesCHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.0 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY Menstrual cycle is a process experienced by every female at one point in their life cycle. In the olden days a young lady experiences her first menstruation in her late teens or early twenties. In recent times, however, some begin their menstrual cycle as early as nine years. The age at menarche (the first time a girl or a young woman menstruates) is widely considered as an important landmark in sexual maturity. However it varies widely betweenRead MoreThe And Menstrual Cycle Disturbance2149 Words   |  9 PagesHirustism and Menstrual Cycle Disturbance Due To Dietary Supplements In Punjab Ayesha Akram, Amna Shabbir, Anum Naz Government College University Faisalabad amnashabbir.160@gmail.com Abstract: The purpose of this study is to check the prevalence of hirsutism and menstrual cycle disturbances due to diet especially egg, yoghurt, milk and chicken. For this purpose 35 diseased patients and 35 normal patients are studied in different areas of PunjabRead MoreEndometriosis: Menstrual Cycle and Staff1458 Words   |  6 Pagesor around the lung or brain. Endometrial implants, while they can cause problems, are benign (Stoppler, 2011). In endometriosis, displaced endometrial tissue continues to act as it normally would: It thickens, breaks down and bleeds with each menstrual cycle. And because this displaced tissue has no way to exit your body, it becomes trapped. Surrounding tissue can become irritated, eventually developing scar tissue and adhesions, which is the abnormal tissue that binds organs together (Staff, 2010)Read MoreEffects Of Menstrual Cycle On Body Weight And Mass1990 Words   |  8 PagesIt is no secret that the menstrual cycle has significant hormonal and physiolo gical changes that can influence physical health by increasing a woman’s appetite and thus her weight. There a number of hormonal changes during the cycle, but the two generally focused on in research are estrogen and progesterone (1,8,12). Most research to date has examined how the menstrual cycle, specifically hormones levels at different stages within the cycle, influence appetite and eating behaviors such as food intakeRead MoreA Flow of Meaning: The Symbolism of the Menstrual Cycle in ZZ Packer’s â€Å"Every Tongue Shall Confess†1745 Words   |  7 PagesBaldwin ï ¿ ½ PAGE * MERGEFORMAT ï ¿ ½1ï ¿ ½ Helena Baldwin Ms. ONeal English 1102 10 October 2011 A Flow of Meaning: The Symbolism of the Menstrual Cycle in ZZ Packers Every Tongue Shall Confess The menstrual cycle has long been considered a symbol of many different things in cultures around the world: in many African cultures, for example, it is recognized as the link to the passing on of life and as such is celebrated by many African women, and in many Judeo-Christian cultures it symbolizes uncleanlinessRead MoreFemale Athletes And The Female Athlete, By Irene Lambrinoudaki And Dimitra Papadimitriou1063 Words   |  5 Pagesharming themselves more by being an athlete and training hard each day. 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AfterRead MoreFor Many People (Both Male And Female), The Whole Idea901 Words   |  4 Pagessystem in both male and females. In females, breasts develop, hair grows under the arms and pubic area and menstruation begins (King Regan, 2014). Once ovulation and menstruation starts the female can become pregnant. Inquiring about one’s menstrual cycle can help to the counselor and client decipher some problems the client may be having. Some girls, according to King et al., (2014), have symptoms of premenstrual syndrome that cause emotional and/or physical issues 3 to 14 days before menses beginsRead MoreBenefits of Triphasic Contraceptives1503 Words   |  7 Pagesregimen has allowed further reductions in total monthly hormone exposure and more closely mimics the dynamic hormonal picture of the female menstrual cycle. During its conception, scientists hypothesised that such physiologically appropriate lower doses would a fford triphasic COC’s fewer side-effects, whilst maintaining contraceptive efficacy and satisfactory cycle control [7-8]. Of the currently available multiphasic agents, triphasic COCs have almost replaced biphasic COC’s and contain up to 40% lowerRead MoreWhy The Bathroom Is A Basic Necessity1241 Words   |  5 Pages(Black and Fawcett 9). One in five girls drop out of school when their periods begin, and those who don’t usually miss five days of school every month (Khan and Gokhale). The main concern the girls face is the inability to properly control their menstrual cycle because of the unavailability of feminine hygiene products. In India, only 12% of 355 million women can afford sanitary pads or tampons for menstruation (Khan and Gokhale). Those who cannot afford sanitary products, â€Å"†¦ rely on old fabric, husks

Grade 12 Bio †Enzyme Lab Free Essays

Enzyme Lab Purpose: To compare the action of the enzyme catalase, to a non-protein catalyst under different conditions. Observations: | |Observations |Rate of Reaction |Interpretations | |A |Sand |- Sand piled up at the bottom of |0 |- There is no reaction between sand and| | | |the test tube and no bubbles | |hydrogen peroxide, because sand does | | | |arose | |not contain any catalysts or enzymes to| | | | | |break down hydrogen peroxide | | |MnO2 |- Reaction occurred right away, |5 |- MnO2 acts like a catalyst which | | | |bubbles rose almost to the top of| |breaks down H2O2 into water and oxygen | | | |the tube | |gas with a lower activation energy | |B |Liver |- Reaction occurred right away, |4 |- Liver contains large amounts of the | | | |and big, white bubbles rose the | |enzyme catalase, which break down H2O2. | | | |top of the test tube | |This made the reaction occur quickly | | | | | |and form bubbles. We will write a custom essay sample on Grade 12 Bio – Enzyme Lab or any similar topic only for you Order Now | | |Potato |- Very little bubbles appeared |2 |- The reaction was very moderate and | | | |from the reaction, and did not | |did ot occur quickly because potato | | | |rise very high in the tube or | |does not have a lot of the enzyme | | | |occur quickly | |catalase | |C |Used liver + Fresh liver |- Some bubbles formed and the |3 |- The reaction should have had a higher| | | |reaction was moderate | |rate of reaction, because the enzymes | | | | | |in the used liver are still active and | | | | | |can be used in the reaction again. The | | | | | |fresh liver can also perform this | | | | | |reaction with its catalase enzyme. Due | | | | | |to an error or impurity of equipment, | | | | | |the reaction was not as strong. | |Used liver + H2O2 |- Reaction occurred quickly and a|4 |- The enzyme in the liver is still | | | |lot of big bubbles formed and | |active and can be used over again, | | | |rose to the top of the test tube | |because enzymes never get used up | |D |Crushed Liver |-Reaction happened immediately, |5 |- Liver contains a large amount of | | | |and a lot of bubbling occurred | |catalase enzyme, which breaks down H2O2| | | |for a while with large, white | |very quickly. Since the liver is | | | |bubbles, and rose to the top of | |crushed, this reaction occurred even | | | |the test tube | |faster because there is a larger | | | | | |surface area of the liver for the H2O2 | | | | | |to react with. | |Crushed Potato |- Very few bubbles that were |3 |- Since the potato is crushed, there is| | | |small formed and they did not | |more surface area for the H2O2 to react| | | |rise very high in the test tube | |with, but potato does not contain any | | | | | |enzymes to break down H2O2, so this | | | | | |reaction was moderate and did not occur| | | | | |quickly. |E |Boiled Liver | – No bubbles rose to the top of |1 |- No reaction and bubbles formed, | | | |the test tube, and a light, white| |because the boiling of the liver caused| | | |cover formed on top of the liver | |denaturing of the proteins, and | | | |with very little, small bubbles | |denatured catalase proteins can not | | | | | |function | | |Liver at 37( C |- Reaction occurred quickly and |5 |- This reaction occurred and formed | | | |large, white bubbles formed and | |large bubbles that rose to the top | | | |elevated up the test tube | |because the liver is 37( C, which is | | | | | |normal human body temperature.Catalase| | | | | |operates and breaks down H2O2 best at | | | | | |this temperature. | | |Liver at 0( C |- No bubbles formed or rose to |0 |- No reaction occurred when the liver | | | |the top of the test tube. No | |was at 0(C because this condition is | | | |reaction occurred. | |too cold for the catalase enzymes to | | | | | |function.Enzyme activity slows down at| | | | | |any temperature below 37( C, and it is | | | | | |the slowest at 0 degrees. Almost no | | | | | |enzyme activity occurs. | Questions: 1. The differences in the rates were mainly because of the different temperatures of the liver, the different particle sizes of the liver and potato, and the product used with H2O2 in the reaction. The reactions that had the fastest rates had liver as the product used in the reaction with hydrogen peroxide.Also, reactions that had liver at normal body temperature (37( C), and had a larger particle size for larger surface area had fast rates of reaction. 2. H2O2 breaks down when other catalysts that can be oxidized by it are present. Because H2O2 is an unstable molecule, some inorganic substances like MnO2 can be oxidized by it, and they release oxygen gas in the reaction. 3. Temperature affects the rate of enzyme action very much. At low temperatures, the enzyme activity is very slow, because the molecules have low kinetic energy and fewer collisions occur between them. This is proven in part E of the lab, where there was no reaction and enzyme activity when the liver was 0( C.At high temperatures, the enzyme activity increases because the molecules have higher kinetic energy and more collisions occur. However, the maximum temperature the enzyme will stay active until is about 40( C. After the temperature reaches higher than 40( C, the protein enzyme will start to denature and slow down. Particle size also affects the rate of enzyme action. Smaller particles allow the rate of enzyme activity to be very high, because there is a larger surface area for the enzyme to react with and break down. This is proven in part D of the lab, where there was a very fast and active reaction with crushed liver and hydrogen peroxide. The large surface area of the crushed liver allows more space for the enzymes to work on and break down hydrogen peroxide. 4.No, the results would not be different if dog liver was used for this investigation. This is because the catalase enzyme will stay active as the temperature increases, up to about 40( C. If the liver is higher than 40 degrees, the enzyme will denature and not work. Since dog liver is exactly 40( C, the results will be the same, because the enzyme will work at a temperature of 40( C, but not any higher. In conclusion, this lab helped consolidate the understanding of how enzymes work, and how temperature and particle size affects the rate of enzyme activity. This activity was an interactive way to see how the enzymes actually function, through liver and potato. ———————– SBI 4U0-B How to cite Grade 12 Bio – Enzyme Lab, Papers

Scarlet Fever Essays - Pediatrics, RTT, Streptococcal Infections

Scarlet Fever A disease caused by an infection with group A B-hemolytic streptococcal bacteria that occurs in a small percentage of people with strep throat. When we hear the words "Scarlet Fever" we often tend to think of a deadly disease that doctors have no cure from. But it is quite the contrary, scarlet fever is just a serious case of strep throat and the medication prescribed by doctors, cures within days. But the symptoms unfortunately are not very pleasant and having Scarlet Fever is not just a walk in the park. After reading up on the disease hopefully the importance of prevention and symptoms will be understood and no more cases of Scarlet Fever will creep up. Scarlet fever was once a common, that usually affects children between the ages of two and ten, disease but now is easily treatable. The organism usuallly enters the body through the mouth or nose. It is generally transmitted from person to person by direct contact. That is, from the sprays of a sneeze from an infected person, or by any indirect contact through door handles previously touched by an infected person. The bacteria produces a toxin that causes a rash that initially appears on the neck and chest, then spreads over the body. The rash of scarlet fever usually begins like a bad sunburn with tiny bumps (papules), and it may itch. The rash usually appears on the second day of a Group A streptococcal throat infection, and the incubation period for Group A strep throat is usually 2-7 days after exposure. Typically the rash begins as small red macules which gradually become elevated. The rash usually appears first on the neck and face, often leaving a clear unaffected area around the mouth. It spreads to the chest and back, then to the rest of the body. In body creases, especially around the underarms and elbows, the rash forms classic red streaks called Pastia's lines. Areas of rash usually blanch (turn white) when you press on them. By the sixth day of a strep infection the rash usually fades, but the affected skin may begin to peel. As the rash fades, peeling (desquamation) may occur around the finger tips, toes, and groin area. This peeling may last up to ten days. Risk factors are strep throat infection, although less than 50% of the patient's who develop scarlet fever have a history of a sore throat. Not all streptococci produce this toxin and not all persons are sensitive to it. Two children in the same family may both have strep infections, but one (who is sensitive to the toxin) may have the rash of scarlet fever and the other may not. Prevention is the early treatment of strep throat. Bacteria are spread by direct contact with infected persons or by droplets exhaled by an infected person. Avoid contact with infected persons. In everyday life, there is no perfect way to avoid the strep infections that cause scarlet fever. At home, when someone is sick with a strep throat, it's always safest to keep drinking glasses and eating utensils separate from those of other family members, and to wash these items thoroughly in very hot soapy water. Use antibacterial soap if possible. Wash your own hands frequently as you care for a child with a strep infection. Symptoms sore throat fever Vomiting Loss of appetite rash on neck and chest small red macules that become elevated fading in about 3 days to leave a rough "sandpaper" feel to the skin peeling (desquamation) of the finger tips, toes, and groin swollen, red tongue (strawberry tongue) Pastia's lines (bright red colour in the underarm and groin creases) Chills Tonsils swell and form a white coating headache generalized discomfort From two to three days after the first appearance of symptoms, red spots may appear on the palate; bright red papilla emerge on the tongue, giving it the well known description of strawberry tongue. A characteristic skin eruption appears on the chest and usually spreads all over the body except the face. This rash fades on pressure. The fever can run as 40 to 40.6 degrees Celsius (104 to 105 F) generally lasts only a few days but has the ability to remain for a week. The rash fades within a week or so, and at that time the skin begins to peel. Estimates are that in a home where someone already has a strep throat infection, about one out of every four family members will get it too. There are also cases where persons,